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of a reviewable order. Thus, the section 25(a) elements of
"aggrieved," "order," "proceeding," and "party" were generally
ignored, but by necessity all four of the elements had to be satisfied.
Portions of the statutory elements are to some extent found in each of
the three general factors-finality, formality, and pragmatisim-but
the difficulty in determining the amount of each general factor
requisite to finding one of the specific statutory elements is a prime
source of criticism of the new test. Although the test may
substantially liberalize reviewability, it offers no precise guidelines.
Moreover, although the court's sense of public interest is
commendable, its opinion warrants close scrutiny for the possibility
that an absolute right of appeal upon meeting certain standards has
been restructured into a discretionary right predicated upon the court
of appeals' appraisal of the public interest involved.
Yet there is reason to commend the result in Medical Committee.
It is altogether too likely that either individually or collectively
management and the SEC can arbitrarily act "within the proxy
rules" to stifle stockholder proposals and effectively chill individual
participation in corporate democracy in derogation of the intent of
the Act. Stockholders have apparently been relieved of the expense
and burden of pursuing their investor rights in private actions against
their corporation. Analysis of reviewability in terms of effect on the
agency, the courts, and the party seeking a remedy is to be
encouraged.8 s More liberal review under the general criteria employed
in Medical Committee could promote effectuation of the stockholder
proposal rules while conforming to section 25(a) review requirements
and should not evoke fear of unwarranted judicial intrusion from an
agency which objectively and fairly performs its statutory obligations.
But liberal interpretations must still meet statutory requirements. It is
imperative for future usage of the-Medical Committee test that the
relationship between finality, formality, and pragmatism and section
25(a)'s review requirements be clarified.
Reviewability of Emergency Suspension Orders Under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the Court of
86. See generally Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to
Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REv. 367 (1968). In a case involving review under the
administrative procedure act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (Supp. V, 1970), the District of Columbia
Circuit has likewise found the "practicalities of administrative involvement" sufficient to
warrant judicial review of otherwise informal SEC action. Independent Broker-Dealers Trade
Ass'n v. SEC, 39 U.S.L.W. 2506 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 4, 1971).
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have recently taken
conflicting views concerning the reviewability of determinations made
by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to section 4(c) of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).8 1 The Act
provides for emergency suspension of the registration of certain
substances termed "economic poisons" when such suspension is
determined by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency to be necessary to prevent "an imminent hazard to the
public.""
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardins9 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the failure of
the Secretary of Agriculture to act within a reasonable time on a
petition for suspension under the FIFRA was equivalent to a final
order denying relief and was therefore reviewable in the court of
appeals. The Environmental Defense Fund and other organizations
involved in environmental protection activities jointly filed a petition
with the Secretary9" requesting the issuance of notices of registration
cancellation for all economic poisons containing DDT, and the
interim suspension of registration for such products pending the
outcome of statutory administrative proceedings." Notices of
cancellation were issued by the Secretary with respect to some uses of
DDT, but no action was taken as to other uses or on the request for
interim registration suspension. Petitioners appealed, seeking to
compel full compliance with their requests. The court denied the
Secretary's motion to dismiss and held that petitioners had standing
as consumers of the regulated products to seek judicial review, 2 the
disposition of a suspension request was not a matter committed by the
FI FRA to unreviewable agency discretion, 93 and administrative
inaction on the suspension request, owing to the urgency of the action
requested and the allegation of "imminent hazard," was equivalent to
97. 7 U.S.C. § 135 (1964).
88. Section 4(c) provides that "the Secretary may, when he finds that such action is
necessary to prevent an imminent hazard to the public, by order, svspend the registration of an
economic poison immediately." Id. § 135b(c). Regarding the substitution of the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency for the secretary, see note 90 infra.
89. 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
90. The functions of the Secretary of Agriculture under the F1 FRA were recently transferred
to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency by section 2(8)(i) of
Reorganization Plan No. 3, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2998.
91. See notes 101-02 infra.
92. 428 F.2d at 1096.
93. Id. at 1098.
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a denial of relief and hence a final order "ripe" for judicial review."
In Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc. v. Hardin,"5 on the other
hand, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed a three-
judge panel on en banc rehearing and held that an emergency
suspension order under the FIFRA was not a final order subject to
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 6 and
therefore a federal district court had no jurisdiction to enjoin
enforcement of such an order. After a news broadcast concerning the/.
contamination of grain with an agricultural fungicide containing a
high percentage of mercury, Nor-Am, the largest seller of mercury-
containing fungicide, was notified by the Department of Agriculture
that, pursuant to section 4(c) of the FIFRA, its registration of
products containing mercury compounds for use in seed treatment
had been suspended, that such products were to be recalled from the
market, and that further shipments would be unlawful.97 Nor-Am and
its distributor then obtained a district court preliminary injunction to
stay enforcement of the suspension order pending the outcome of the
formal administrative proceedings outlined in the FI FRA. Initially, a
three-judge panel of the court of appeals upheld the district court's
jurisdiction and affirmed the granting of the injunction. However, on
en banc rehearing, the full court reversed the three-judge panel and
held the suspension order to be unreviewable.99
Agricultural poisons are regulated by the FI FRA, which was
formerly administered by the Secretary of Agriculture but is now
under the purview of the Administrator of the newly created
Environmental Protection Agency. 10  The statute requires the
94. Id. at 1099.
95. 435 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970), rev'g on rehearing, 435 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3347 (U.S. Feb. 5, 1971) (No. 1317).
96. Section 10(c) of the APA provides in part: "Agency action made reviewable by statute
and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject tojudicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly
reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action. " U.S.C. § 704
(Supp. V, 1970).
97. Subsequently, the recall order was suspended "in view of the practical difficulty of safely
disposing of the compound other than through ordinary use channels." 435 F.2d at 1136.
98. 435 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1970)
99. Nor-Am Agricultural Prod., Inc.-v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970). Compare
Nor-Am and Environmental Defense Fund with Acquavella v. Richardson, 39 U.S.L.W. 2446
(2d Cir. Jan. 25, 1971). In Acquavella, the court held that a summary order of the Secretary of
HEW suspending Medicare payments to an "extended-care facility" constituted a reviewable
final order under section 10 of the APA.
100. See note 90 supra.
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registration of economic poisons and establishes procedures whereby
the registration may be cancelled. 01 Because these procedures are
likely to be time-consuming, the Administrator is empowered to
suspend a registration immediately if he finds such action to be
necessary to prevent an imminent public hazard. The legislative
history of the 1964 amendments to the FIFRA, which included the
clause concerning the emergency suspension power, does not contain a
discussion of the term "imminent hazard," but it does mention that
the procedure is modeled after a similar provision in the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 0 2 clearly implying that the language
in both acts should be given the same meaning. 3
Statutory review of suspension, cancellation, and other orders
under the FI FRA is provided in section 4(d), which states in part that
"[i]n a case of actual controversy as to the validity of any order under
this section, any person who will be adversely affected by such order
may obtain judicial review . .. "" thereof in the appropriate United
States court of appeals. Section 4(c) also provides that "[flinal orders
. . . under this section shall be subject to judicial review, in
accordance with the provisions of subsection (d) of this section."''
The Act determines the availability of judicial review for final
orders but is not determinative when a party attempts to obtain review
at some juncture other than that prescribed by the controlling statute.
Two questions are posed which must be answered affirmatively if
review is to be granted. Initially, the court must determine whether the
administrative action involved is subject to judicial scrutiny at all; °0 if
101. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1964), provides in relevant part: "The Secretary, in accordance
with the procedures specified herein, may suspend or cancel the registration of an economic
poison whenever it does not appear that the article or its labeling or other material required to be
submitted complies with. . . this title."
It further provides that a cancellation is effective thirty days after service of appropriate
notice "unless within such time the registrant (1) makes the necessary corrections; (2) files a
petition requesting that the matter be referred to an advisory committee; or (3) files objections
and requests a public hearing." Id.
102. H.R. REP. No. 1125, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1964).
103. See 435 F.2d at 1161 n.6. Under the FFDCA a finding of imminent hazard is a
prerequisite to summary suspension of a license to market drugs if such suspension is to be
effective prior to full administrative proceedings. The suspension power was intended to be used
only in the event of serious danger to the public which could not be prevented by less summary
methods. See S. REP. No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 7 (1962); H.R. REP. No. 2464,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1962).
104. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(d) (1964). The present section 4(d) was added in the 1964
amendments to the FI FRA.
105. Id. § 135b(c).
106. Switchmen's Union v. Nationil Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 301 (1943).
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this question is answered in the affirmative, the court must then
determine whether irreparable injury will result if judicial review is
withheld. 07 The complexity of a determination concerning
reviewability is increased when the discretionary power of an agency
or executive official is challenged as being arbitrary and capricious.0 "
Section 10(e) of the APA directs a reviewing court to "hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law. . ,,"'I The proper interpretation of the
above directive has been vigorously debated by the commentators."'
The principal source of controversy concerns the effect to be given to
the introductory proviso of section 10, which excepts "agency action
. . . committed to agency discretion by law.""' Professor Davis
maintains that where action is by law "committed" to agency
discretion, it is not reviewable even for arbitrariness or abuse of
discretion; conversely, to the extent it is not "committed" to agency
discretion it is reviewable. Under this approach, the courts can
determine on practical grounds whether or not administrative action
is "committed" to agency discretion and, therefore, whether it is
reviewable. n2
Professor Berger, on the other hand, equates the phrase
"committed to agency discretion" with "committed to lawful agency
discretion" which, by definition, excludes all action which is arbitrary
or an abuse of discretion from the exception. He concludes that all
administrative action is reviewable with respect to abuse of discretion
except to the extent that judicial review is expressly precluded by
statute. 113
Judicial opinions have differed on the question of whether
107. See, e.g., Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
108. See Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
109. APA § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. V, 1970).
110. See, e.g., 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.16 (Supp. 1965)
[hereinafter cited as DAVIS]; Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65
COLUM. L. REv. 55 (1965); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Reply to Professor Davis,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 783 (1966); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Rejoinder to Professor
Davis' "'Final Word," 114 U. PA. L. REv. 816 (1966); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A
Sequel, 51 MINN. L. REV. 601 (1967); Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Postscript, 114
U. PA. L. REV. 823 (1966); Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness is Not Always Reviewable, 51
MINN. L. REV. 643 (1967).
111. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (Supp. V, 1970).
112. 4 DAVIS §§ 28.08 & 28.16.
113. Berger, 51 MINN. L. REv., supra note 110, at 609-10.
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discretionary agency action is reviewable for abuse of discretion. A
few cases have held that the discretion exception of the APA
unqualifiedly cuts off all review of administrative action for abuse of
discretion," 4 and at least one case has expressly adopted the Davis
approach."5 Some cases have even gone so far as to hold that where
the relevant statute is worded in permissive terms, agency action is
never reviewable for abuse of discretion.16
The majority of recent opinions have, however, held arbitrary and
capricious agency action to be reviewable even where such action is
discretionary," 7 and two contemporary Supreme Court decisions
appear to support this position. In Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp"8 the Court stated that "[t]here
is no presumption against judicial review and in favor of
administrative absolutism . . . unless that purpose is fairly
discernible in the statutory scheme.""' 9 In Barlow v. Collins"20 the
Court unequivocally stated that a legislative intent to preclude judicial
review cannot be inferred from the mere fact that a statute is worded
permissively to give an administrative official the power to "prescribe
such regulations as he may deem proper."' 2' By virtue of these recent
Supreme Court decisions, reviewability of discretionary action must
be presumed unless there is a clear statutory command to the
contrary. The trend in the lower federal courts appears to go even
further and hold that arbitrary agency action is always reviewable.1'2
Once discretionary agency action is determined to be reviewable,
the court must turn its attention to matters of finality, adequacy of
remedy, and exhaustion of administrative remedies. Finality of action
is generally a prerequisite to review of lower court rulings by a higher
court, but the finality rule also includes judicial review of administra-
114. See, e.g., United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1964); Pullman
Trust & Savings Bank v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Iil. 1964).
115. Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904 (1965).
116. See. e.g., United States v. District Director of 1mm. & Nat., 175 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.
1949).
117. See Velasco v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 386 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1967); Overseas
Media Corp. v. McNamara, 385 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Atewooftakewa v. Udall, 277 F.
Supp. 464 (W.D. Okla. 1967); Kolstad v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 757 (D. Mont. 1967);
Chamber of Commerce v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 301 (D.N.D. 1967).
118. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
119. Id. at 157.
120. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
121. Id. at 166. The statutory language cited appears at 16 U.S.C. § 590d(3) (1964).
122. Cf. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S. Doc. No. 248,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 310-11 (1946).
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tive action. In the latter context, the finality doctrine has been applied
in- a pragmatic way'3 with "final" action including any effective
administrative action for which there is no other adequate remedy in
any court. 24 This approach was utilized in Isbrandtsen Co. v. United
States"' where the court phrased the test in terms of the consequences
of the action under review. 26 Since the order in Isbrandtsen would
have visited severe consequences upon the petitioner, the court
adopted the rule that review will be granted to protect a party from
irreparable injury which would likely result from agency acts which
directly and immediately affect the interests of the party.'" Indeed,
Professor Davis asserts that "[n]o court requires exhaustion [of
administrative remedies] when exhaustion will involve irreparable
injury. . . ."'2 The demonstration of irreparable injury, however,
requires a strong showing of harm such as loss of reputation 2 1 or the
loss of the monetar'y or moral value of an asserted right or defense.130
The administrative process is allowed to continue if a party is
adequately protected by the administrative or subsequent .judicial
process, but immediate relief should be granted if a court Would be
unable to provide an adequate remedy once the administrative process
is complete.131
In Nor-Am the three-judge panel focused on the predicament in
which the plaintiffs were placed by the Secretary's emergency
suspension order. Nor-Am and Morton, the distributor, were faced
with a difficult decision: should they comply with the Secretary's
order and halt production and distribution, or should they ignore the
order and face severe penalties, including possible fines and
imprisonment? 32 The full court on rehearing, however, was not
123. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 167 (1967); Gordon & Co. v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., ._ F. Supp. - (D. Mass. 1970).
124. See Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961).
125. 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 US. 990 (1954).
126. Whether or not the statutory requirements of finality are satisfied in any given case
depends not upon the label affixed to its action by the administrative agency but rather
upon a realistic appraisal of the consequences of such action. . . . Under this test a final
order need not fiecessarily be the very last order. Id. at 55.
127. Id. at 55-56.
128. 3 DAVIS § 20.01. Professor Davis also holds the view that: "The statement the courts
so often repeat in their opinions-that judicial relief must be denied until administrative
remedies have been exhausted-is seriously at variance with the holdings." Id.
129. Pierne v. Valentine, 291 N.Y. 333,52 N.E.2d 890 (1943).
130. Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939).
131. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 432 (abridged student ed.
1965).
132. See 7 U.S.C. § 135f (1964).
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persuaded that the possible harm to plaintiffs was irreparable or that
the suspension order was "final" under either the FIFRA or the
APA 33 and hence found the district court without jurisdiction to
enjoin enforcement of the order.
Addressing itself to the FIFRA, the court reasoned that the
language in subsection 4(d) providing for judicial review of "any
order under this section"'' 3 must be construed as referring only to
final orders, since subsection 4(c) provides that "[flinal orders of the
Secretary under this section shall be subject to judicial review, in
accordance with the provisions of subsection (d). . . ."13 The court
found that section 4(d) provides details of the procedural aspects of
review already authorized by section 4(c). The court then
characterized the emergency suspension order as "a tentative,
temporary measure . . . . preliminary to more thorough
administrative consideration"' 36 and not a final order within the
meaning of the FI FRA.
The claim that the suspension order possessed sufficient finality to
qualify for review under the "final agency action" provision of the
APA37 was also rejected. Conceding that the concept of finality is a
flexible one under the APA, the court nevertheless found that the
concept was not flexible enough to allow disregard of the concept of
congressional delegation of power. Relying heavily upon the purpose
of the emergency suspension power, the court suggested that the
power was within the APA's exception for action committed to
agency discretion by stating that a suspension order "involves highly
discretionary administrative action with deeply rooted antecedents in
the realm of public health and safety."'138
In contrast to Nor-Am, the court in Environmental Defense Fund
determined that the Secretary of Agriculture's failure to act on a
petition for emergency suspension of DDT products was equivalent to
a final agency order ripe for judicial review under the FIFRA. In
reaching this result, the court proceeded in three steps. First, merely
because the statutory language regarding emergency suspension
orders is written in permissive terms, a congressional intent to
preclude judicial review was not inferred; second, in view of the
133. 435 F.2d at 1156-57.
134. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
135. Section 4(c), 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1964) (emphasis added).
136. 435 F.2d at 1157.
137. APA § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. V, 1970).
138. 435 F.2d at 1158.
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urgency of a petition for suspension and the allegation that delay
would result in irreparable injury, the issue was "ripe" for review; and
third, failure to order suspension of the registration of DDT amounts
to a final order denying such a request because such inaction has an
identical effect on the rights of the parties. Review is not to be
frustrated, noted the court, merely because the agency chooses
inaction rather than action. 139 Since the administrative inaction made
meaningful judicial review impossible, however, the court remanded
the case to the Secretary 4 ' for either an affirmative disposition of the
proceedings or a statement of reasons for continued inaction.', With
respect to the request for issuance of notices of cancellation, however,
the court determined that the delay had not taken on the character of
a denial of relief since the Secretary had made "a few feeble gestures"
toward compliance, having issued some notices while presumably
contemplating the request for others.
A fundamental question presented by the Nor-Am and
Environmental Defense Fund cases is whether the same standard of
judicial review should be applied both to orders granting and orders
denying emergency registration suspension. The two decisions may
possibly be read together as a statement that, because of the
congressional purpose to prevent "imminent hazard to the public," a
suspension order will not be reviewable but the denial of a suspension
order will be. The potential consequences to the public of an erroneous
administrative judgment with respect to a suspension request are
obviously greater where subsequent events prove a denial to have been
ill-advised than where a suspension order proves to have been
unnecessary. Furthermore, a suspension order triggers expedited
administrative proceedings, 4 2 whereas arguably a denial of
suspension is the end of the road for a petitioner. Notwithstanding
these arguments, however, the distinction between orders granting and
139. The court warned that "an agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its
decision in the form of inaction rather than in the form of an order denying relief." 428 F.2d at
1099.
140. The court of appeals again remanded for further proceedings in Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1971). On the first remand, the Secretary had
formally denied suspension, stating that while a substantial question existed as to the safety of
DDT, the evidence did not warrant summary suspension. In its second opinion, the court found
that the Secretary had set the standard of proof too high in light of the statutory purpose of
protecting the public from "imminent hazard." Id.
141. The court made it clear that if suspension were refused, the basis for the refusal "should
appear clearly on the record." 428 F.2d at 1100.
142. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1964).
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denying suspension, suggested in Nor-Am,4 3 was found to be
unpersuasive by the District of Columbia Circuit in its second
Environmental Defense Fund decision.'44 Although it is true that a
denial of suspension would not trigger expedited administrative
proceedings, normal proceedings would follow later if notices of
cancellation have been issued. The preference expressed in Nor-Am
for protecting the public health and safety rather than business profits
and good will represents a commendable value judgment. However,
this judgment should have a bearing not on the question of
reviewability but rather on the question of the relative weight to be
accorded the administrative decision on review.'
Another possible distinction between the two cases is that the
remedy pursued by plaintiffs in Nor-Am was a suit for injunction in
the district court, rather than a petition for review in a court of
appeals as was the case in Environmental Defense Fund. The sole
statutory review provided by the FIFRA is indeed review in the
appropriate court of appeals.' The Act also provides, however, that
"Julpon the filing of such petition the court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to affirm or set aside the order complained of. .. .
Clearly, as a matter of statutory construction the courts of appeals
cannot claim exclusive jurisdiction to review suspension or other
orders until the petition for review has been filed. 4 Furthermore,
143. 435 F.2d at 1159.
144. The court stated in relevant part:
Nor can we find in the statutory scheme any support for the Nor-Am distinction between
orders granting and denying suspension. For the administrative proceedings that follow
suspension are equally available after a refusal to suspend. If the Secretary orders
suspension, the proceedings are expedited; otherwise they may follow in due course after
he issues cancellation notices. In either event, there is a prospect of further administrative
action, but that prospect does not resolve for us the question of reviewability. - F.2d at
145. It should be noted that the Nor-Am court's attempt to distinguish Environmental
Defense Fund on this point is marred by factual error. The Nor-Am court originally confused
the facts of Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970), with
those of Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. HEW, 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See 27
AD. L. 2D 928, 936 (7th Cir. 1970). This was later corrected in the'official report of the case.
435 F.2d at 1159.
146. The FIFRA provides that a person adversely affected by an administrative order may
obtain review in the court of appeals by filing therein a petition to have the order set aside. 7
U.S.C. § 135b(d) (1964). The provisions relating to judicial review were added by the 1964
amendments to the FIFRA. See § 4, Pub. L. No. 88-305, 78 Stat. 190 (1964).
147. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(d) (1964) (emphasis added).
148. The legislative history tends to confirm this inference. The House Report on the 1964
FIFRA amendments notes that "[s]ection 4 adds a new section d to section 4 of the act to
provide for judicial review . . . by petition to an appropriate U.S. court of appeals. . . . The
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Leedom v. Kyne 49 would seem dispositive of the issue of the
jurisdiction of a district court to entertain an original suit to set aside
administrative action where statutory review is limited to the courts of
appeal. In Leedom, a district court was held to have jurisdiction over
a suit to set aside an NLRB representation order notwithstanding the
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act which appeared to
limit review to the courts of appeal. 1'
The original decision of the three-judge panel in Nor-Am is
therefore correct in its determination that the statutory review
provisions of the FIFRA do not deprive the district courts of
jurisdiction to entertain initial review of administrative action
asserted to have been arbitrary and capricious. Indeed, the
government did not argue against this position,' 51 and the issue was
apparently not raised during the en banc rehearing.
A third possible distinction between Nor-Am and Environmental
Defense .Fund is that the suspension order in Nor-Am had an adverse
effect upon the private economic interests of Nor-Am and its
distributor, while the denial of-suspension in Environmental Defense
Fund had a potentially adverse effect upon the public interest in health
and safety. The Nor-Am decision rests in part upon this distinction'
but improperly so with respect to the question of reviewability.
Whether an administrative order affects private or public interests
may be highly relevant when considering the merits of a controversy
but should not affect a court's determination on the question of
reviewability 10
The agency orders in both Nor-Am and Environmental Defense
Fund seemingly carried with them sufficiently direct and immediate
effects upon the interests of the petitioners to merit judicial review.
Certainly the Environmental Defense Fund holding that excessive
administrative delay on a suspension request is equivalent to a final
order denying suspension was a proper one. In its subsequent opinion
court would then have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm or set aside the order." H.R. REP. No.
1125, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1964) (emphasis added).
149. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
50. The Court observed: "This suit is not one to 'review,' in the sense of that term as used
in the [NLRA], a decision of the Board made within its jurisdiction. Rather it is one to strike
down an order of the Board made in excess of its delegated powers. . . ... Id. at 188.
151. 435 F.2d at 1134.
152. Id. at 1160.
153. Where an administrative order affects private economic interests, a sufficient basis is
ordinarily present to hold the order "final" and reviewable. lsbrandtsen Co. v. United States,
211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir, 1954). The statement in the text is the view adopted in dictum by the
District of Columbia Circuit in the second Environmental Defense Fund opinion. - F.2d at -
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the court reflected an evolving temperament of increased judicial
scrutiny of discretionary administrative standards:
We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the long and fruitful
collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts. For many years
courts have treated administrative policy decisions with great deference ...
Courts occasionally asserted, but less often exercised, the power to set aside
agency action on the ground that an impermissible factor had entered into the
decision, or a crucial factor had not been considered. Gradually, however, the
power has come into more frequent use, and with it, the requirement that
administrators articulate the factors on which they base their decisions. "
Failure to appreciate this principle certainly contributed to the second
Nor-Am decision. The facts were undisputed in Nor-Am that there
was no evidence indicating that the products whose registration had
been suspended were involved in any incidents or that the products
had caused adverse effects in more than twenty years of use.
Furthermore, a fair inference could be drawn that the one incident had
been the sole motivating factor behind the suspension order and had
been the result of negligence on the part of the injured persons.'
Nothing in the FIFRA compels the conclusion that a suspension
order issued without factual justification should be immune from
threshold judicial review. For this reason, the second Nor-Am
decision holding that the emergency suspension order was not a final
order and therefore not reviewable appears erroneous.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In Jewel Companies, Inc. v. FTC' the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that a district court has jurisdiction, prior to the
completion of FTC proceedings and notwithstanding the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, to determine whether a
commissioner in voting for the issuance of a complaint had
improperly interpreted his statutory obligation. The FTC brought
154. - F.2d at - Compare FTC v. Crowther, 430 F.2d 510 (D.C. Cir. 1970), discussed at
DEcisIONS section supra. For further indication from the same court of the increasing emphasis
on collaboration between court and agency, see Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,
F.2d , - (D.C. Cir. 1970).
155. The precise holding of the three-judge panel, reversed on rehearing, was stated as
follows: "[W]e do not here purport to balance the conflicting interests of the public. Rather we
hold that, at the present juncture, the finding of the district court that the suspension of the
registration was arbitrary and capricious is adequately supported on the record." 435 F.2d at
1145.
156. 432 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1970).
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